LOYAL OPPOSITION AND THE
EPISTEMOLOGY OF CONSCIENCE

WILLIAM ]. ABRAHAM

A crucial question which generally faces all rational minorities or individuals who
do not fit into the intellectual mainstream is this: how do they justify the moral
claims that they advance in the face of opposition and even ridicule? In other words,
how do they make good their claims in the teeth of widespread contrary opinion?1
In this exploratory paper I shall argue that one of the best ways to respond to this is
by a theory of conscience. En route to this I shall attempt two other tasks. First, I
shall briefly indicate why it is a good thing to have some kind of theoretical base for
our minority reports. Second, I shall draw attention to the weaknesses of four common ways of dealing with the epistemic status of minority opinion. On the other
side of my proposals concerning conscience, I shall conclude with a brief comment
on the role of conscience in the empowerment of Christian minorities.

In posing the issue in the sharp manner represented by my opening question, I
am not assuming that what is right is determined by majority opinion. That thesis is
so obviously mistaken that there is no need to argue the negative case involved.
What is at stake is more subtle than this, and it is more profound. What we want to
know revolves around a series of concerns which are naturally directed towards
those who stand outside the mainstream. How do they know they are right? What
warrant do they have for their proposals? What ground(s) do they have for their
confidence?
A clear example that comes to mind is the predicament faced by John Wesley
and the early Methodists who challenged the prevailing theology, spirituality, morality, and evangelistic practices of the Anglican tradition of the eighteenth century.
Wesley and his friends faced a barrage of objections which sooner or later had to be
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answered. Once this process began, they were driven to deal with the whole range of
fundamental questions w hich lie below the surface of the initial controversies. This is far
from being a merely political or prudential operation, for in time new insights emerge or
old truths are rediscovered; invariably a whole new tradition arises to enrich our ecclesial
and cultural life.
To be sure, a good case can be made that all opinions must face this kind of query sooner or later, for majorities as much as for those in the position of the loyal opposition.
Moreover, there is a long and distinguished school in epistemology which has insisted that
we can know nothing, including nothing in the field of morality, unless we have first established our position on a sound basis. Hence foundationalists of one kind or another have
long maintained that nobody, not even an intelligent majority, has the right to claim they are
correct unless they can logically trace their position back to adequate foundations represented by self-justifying or secure premises, axioms, first principles, and the like. Immanuel Kant's
categorical imperative and John Stuart Mill's principle of utility seek to provide precisely such
a secure foundation. Hence on at least one reading of our epistemic situation, everybody,
and not only minorities, is required to explain and justify their position.
However, no such theory lies behind the present request for warrants. Moreover, it
would be question-begging to rest on such a set of assumptions. What some minorities
rightly w ill want to challenge is this whole approach to the foundations of morality. It is
precisely this challenge against a central feature of the modern Enlightenment which puts
them outside the mainstream in the first place. Hence they will correctly protest that their
position is the kind of radical position that calls this line of inquiry into question. We had
better have other reasons for pressing the issue before us than merely an appeal to some
kind of classical foundationalism.
It is also worth noting that in some quarters the very idea of suggesting that minorities
of any sort should be asked to give an account of their proposals of the kind envisaged
here is otiose. We are all aware of the extent to which it has become fashionable to see
this kind of request as a disguised form of oppression or violence; such questioning is perceived as a type of dominance in which those in the majority make demands of the
minority as a means of keeping challengers out of the discussion and eventually out of
positions of power. 2
Not all minorities are prepared to take up this kind of defensive posture. For example,
it is more than significant that many Evangelicals are extremely reluctant to playa card of
victimization by oppression. There can be no doubting the historical reality behind their
systematic exclusion from the academy and from crucial centers of power within mainline Protestant churches. Mature observers can readily identify the academic, political, and
theological ideologies which have been developed to provide intellectual explanations for
such exclusion. In these circumstances there is great temptation to take on the status of
the victim and seek to gain power on the basis of past discrimination and exclusion. Some
have succumbed to this strategy, but I suspect that it is thoroughly uncharacteristic of the
Evangelical tradition as a whole. At least two important convictions underlie this hesitation .
First, Evangelicals deep down are committed to the search for truth as a logically distinct
value or good which cannot be reduced to political or social interest. This is deeply incom-
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patible with any move which would make the formal commitment to truth equivalent to a
quest for power. To be sure, Evangelicals are only too aware that the reality is often different.) Human beings, especially those in positions of power, all too easily can dress up the
quest for dominance and power in the form of a quest for truth. Any tradition which takes
sin seriously will be aware of such possible self-deception. However, the very claim that
such self-deception is possible or actually has happened is a claim to truth which cannot be
reduced to one more quest for power if we are to take it seriously. Hence any global theory of truth which reduces truth itself to power is self-referentially destructive.
Secondly, Evangelicals have learned over the years that the social institutions of the
church and society depend on confessional claims which need to be sustained across the
generations. These confessional claims are held to embody not just the reality of majority
victory or the attainment of raw power; they are taken to embody nothing less than the
revealed truth of Cod. Hence Evangelicals have very deep theological warrants for refusing to play the ideological card of victimization when they are hard pressed to do so by
the example of other minority groups in the neighborhood.
Why, then, do we raise this deep question of warrant at all and present it as especially
acute for minorities? On a general level we raise the matter because a rejection of foundationalism does not for one moment mean the end of the debate concerning the justification of moral claims. All it signals is that one way of resolving this complex matter has
been abandoned. Moral foundationalists, like Kant and Mill, are sometimes wont to be
perplexed by the rejection of their position. Somehow they think that if we reject their
position we have rejected morality proper and maybe even epistemology proper. Worse
still, they may think that we have automatically embraced some sort of relativism or
nihilism. This is an illusion. All we have abandoned is one family of solutions for questions
about the deep structure and justification of morality. We have simply rejected an important and illuminating alternative in the debate about the foundations of morality.
Consequently, what we have before us is a tremendous moral and epistemological challenge. We now have to work out an alternative to what has stood as a prevailing consensus in the field.
As to the special case of minorities, there are three considerations which relate to their
responsibilities. First, because they stand outside the mainstream, the onus of proof falls
on them in the dynamic of debate. At the very least there is psychological and social pressure to explain their position. Indeed it is this sort of pressure which makes minorities
such a valuable part of the social order. Often they provide the alternatives which are
needed when the mainstream becomes exhausted. They constitute a kind of monastic
renewal for the wider world they inhabit. Moreover, the vigor and urgency with which
they usually present their claims can open up the issues and provide new perspectives in
a refreshing manner.
Secondly, the courtesies of debate require that they explain the deeper convictions
that lie behind their position. After all, the majority hold the territory in part because in
years gone by they won the debate about the field as a whole. They earned the right to
be heard because once upon a time they delivered the relevant goods. Indeed at one
time they probably were the minority opinion. Hence the onus is now on the relevant
minority to come through with the intellectual goods.
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Thirdly, without some kind of critical check or some kind of reasoned account of their
position, those in opposition repeatedly fall into various forms of fanaticism. They simply
end up in the position of the dogmatist or zealot who requires us to take what they say as
correct merely on their word. This helps nobody in the debate. It puts the opposition in
the awkward position of having nothing substantial to say beyond repeating the point at
issue; it prevents the majority from benefiting from the serious discussion of an altemative
scenario; and, worst of all, it misses a golden opportunity to advance our understanding of
the logic and justification of moral claims.
Christian minorities have an additional incentive to develop their position. They owe it
as constitutive of their love of their neighbor. To misuse a standard text in apologetics,
they have a duty to give a reason for the hope that is within them. They are called to
think through and share their convictions so that the Cod they serve may be glorified and
honored. In the past they have generally seized on this option gladly.
This does not mean that it is easy. There is always the temptation to take the line of
least resistance and find an excuse to avoid answering hard questions or to short circuit
the debate by turning the whole issue into an affair of sociology and politics. The latter is
all too visible when the debate is transformed into a power struggle to be resolved by
votes, caucuses, intrigue, and the like. Political action is always inescapable and sociological analysis is generally invaluable; yet without the patient attending to the moral, theological, and philosophical considerations which swirl around the discussion, the results can be
socially disastrous. Such debate is not a substitute for war or violence; it may at times be
part of the cure for our social and ecclesiastical strife.

II
Let me pursue now our query in a quasi-historical manner. How might a loyal opposition resolve the question of the warrants for its position? Let us look very briefly at four
possibilities. They involve in turn an appeal to one's identity in a community, to divine
revelation, to intuition, and to empowerment.
In the first case we envisage that the grounding of one's decisions go back to one's formation in a community. Thus the minority may simply appeal to its membership in a
community; it appeals to its identity in a particular tradition, group, or class. On the surface this appears a hopelessly simplistic solution to our problem. However, it would be a
mistake to take it simplistically. What usually underlies the appeal to community is a
much wider story about the human condition, about the formation of our moral identity,
about the nature of human community itself, about the character of morality, and about
the virtues and vices identified by a community in the pursuit of its preservation and welfare. It is precisely because the appeal to community can be spelled out to embrace such
a rich network of material that it has become exceedingly attractive of late.
Unfortunately, this richness does not begin to deal with the fundamental objection that
is naturally lodged against it. The chief problem with this proposal is that we want to
know how we can be sure that our favored community is right. Explaining in great detail
the various elements which are buried in this option does not begin to grapple with this
problem, for the same question will break out with respect to these claims too. All along
the line the critic will want to know: "What are the warrants for the particular claim or set

Loyal Opposition and the Epistemology of Conscience

I 39

of claims proposed by the community in question?" Clearly this takes us right back to
where we started.
Alternatively, as a second possibility, the minority might appeal to divine revelation. In
this instance one's position is grounded in what God has revealed, say, in Scripture or in
Christ. The warrant is the fact that God has spoken definitively and has made known
what we should morally do; or, less strongly, we can infer what we ought to do from
what God has told us to do. However, in this case, too, problems immediately surface.
First, questions will arise as to which revelation should be used. Which of the many
putative revelations available should one accept as genuine? Unless this question is
resolved, one will be at a loss as to how to proceed. Secondly, and more importantly,
even if this issue is resolved, we will have to face the age-old question developed in tantalizing fashion by Plato in the Euthyphro. Granted that we now know what God requires
of us, does God require action 'x' because it is good, or is 'x' good because it is required
by God. If we take the first option, then morality is logically independent of religion, and
we do not need to appeal to divine revelation to ground our moral claims. If we take the
second option, the foundations of morality become purely arbitrary, for our moral claims
are decided by the whim of the deity without there being any moral constraints on what
can be deemed as required even by God.
If we cannot appeal to community or revelation as the way ahead, then what about an
appeal to intuition? Here we meet a third epistemic scenari0 4 This would fit very naturally
with our quest, for it is characteristic of minorities to take a stand at a very deep level on
their convictions. In the end they often claim just to see the truth of what they are proclaiming. There is nothing below their claim on which it rests. As the legendary Luther put
it in his famous phrase, "God help me, I can do no other." This strategy would fit nicely
with the reluctance to argue. In this analysis there is no argument; arguments presuppose
fundamental premises or axioms which in the nature of the case are taken for granted; so
it would be futile to argue for their acceptance. In other words, it is the very expression of
these fundamental premises or axioms which are at issue on this reading of the situation.
These are seen to be true intuitively; they need no demonstration or support.
Once again it is not difficult to identify the difficulties with this sort of strategy. As the
history of the debate about the value of intuitionism shows, critics have latched on to two
primary objections. First, intuitionists are generally divided on the kind of propositions
which they profess to see. Some see particular instances and then from these attempt to
build general rules. Others claim to intuit the general rules and then apply them to particular cases. If intuition is a reliable faculty, there should be no such deep disagreement
between those committed to its use. This defect in the formalties of what is perceived is
then further compounded by the second objection. When we move from the formal to
the material content of the supposed perceptions, we find even more disagreement.
Intuitionists notoriously see different propositions to be true, whether the propositions
have as their subject general rules or particular cases. They cannot agree on which cases
genuinely count as examples of good or evil action or on which rules embody good or
bad principles. In these circumstances, it is extremely tempting to look for non-rational
causes of the beliefs of intuitionists, say, in terms of gender or class analysis.
A fourth altemative is to ground one's proposals in the fact that they will be instrumental
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in bringing about the empowerment of the oppressed or the marginalized. Here one argues
that the ultimate norm or warrant for action is the potential changes embodied in the moral
action proposed; the envisaged changes are constituted by the liberation or full personhood
of the victimized group. However, once again, difficulties meet us at every tum.
First, this proposal rests on projected predictions which are precarious in the extreme.
Merely because someone says that a particular moral stance will liberate some group or
other is no guarantee that such a moral stance will actually do the job envisaged. We
need some sort of empirical generalization or evidence that things will turn o ut as we
think. Secondly, this option surrenders the epistemic value of our moral claims. It treats
moral proposals as purely instrumental, as a means to an end, thus stripping them of any
categorical content. Finally, this alternative begs the questions from the outset. It already
assumes that we know that the end in view is morally obligatory, and it does this without
telling us why we should take this as a given. [t does not secure this end as justified or
warranted. Note that the objection here is not that the end may not be in fact morally
obligatory; on the contrary, it may well be morally required. The objection is that we have
not advanced one w hit in knowing whether the proposed liberation is morally obligatory.
The obvious lessons to be learned from this review is that any account of the warrants
for our moral claims are likely to be highly ramified. Even though I have raised questions
about the viability of each option, I do not at all hold that they should be rejected in toto.
To the contrary, I want to suggest that each of them may well have a contribution to
make to any comprehensive account of our moral existence. The challenge is to develop
the kind of rich vision which will do justice to the relevant insights hidden in these proposals, while at the same time facing up to the epistemic queries with which we began
our deliberations. Moreover, we need a central concept which can enable us to bring
these insights together in coherent and natural manner. I suggest that we can make
progress in this by deploying and developing the idea of conscience.

III
The root idea of conscience is that we are endowed by Cod with the competence to
engage in moral discernment. In classical renderings of conscience such discernment has
characteristically been constituted by our ability to see that we should do good rather
than evil, a very formal first principle of morality, and by our ability to see what the good
requires of us in various moral situations, the material content of morality.
Crucial to this understanding of conscience is the claim that conscience is a capacity
given to us in creation by God. Minimalist descriptions of conscience as a moral sense, a
faculty of the soul, the candle of the Lord, the voice of Cod, and the like, are really hopelessly reduced accounts of this very substantial metaphysical and theological proposal.
Even less satisfactory are those accounts of conscience which reduce it to some abstract
right to dissent from current orthodoxy or establishment opinion. In this case the appeal
to conscience, seen in such expressions, "Well, I have a right to my conscience on this
matter," is simply the dogmatic claim of an individual to hold to the contingent opinion of
the moment. [t does not begin to do justice to the epistemic weight assigned to the concept of conscience in the pre-modern Christian world.
Few have captured the issue in modern times as forcefully as John Henry Newman s
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His central points are laid out with characteristic forcefulness . To begin, conscience is rooted in a clear doctrine of creation.
I say, then, that the Supreme Being is of a certain character, which, expressed in
human language, we call ethical. He has the attributes of justice, truth, wisdom,
sanctity, benevolence and mercy, as eternal characteristics in his nature, the very
law of his being, identical with himself; and next, when he became creator, he
implanted this law, which is himself, in the intelligence of all his rational creatures.
The divine law, then, is the rule of ethical truth, the standard of right and wrong, a
sovereign, irreversible, absolute authority in the presence of men and angels .... This
law as apprehended in the minds of individual men, is called ., conscience'; and
though it may suffer refraction in passing into the intellectual medium of each, it is
not therefore affected so as to lose its character of being the divine law, but still has,
as such, the prerogative of commanding obedience 6
For Newman this view is shared across denominational boundaries.
When Anglicans, Wesleyans, the various Presbyterian sects in Scotland, and other
denominations speak of conscience, they mean what we mean, the voice of God in
the nature and heart of man, as distinct from the voice of revelation. They speak of
a principle planted within us, before we have had any training, although training
and experience are necessary for its strength, growth, and formation. They consider
it a constituent element of the mind, as our perception of our ideas may be, as our
powers of reasoning, as our sense of order and the beautiful, and our other intellectual endowments.
Moreover, both Protestants and Catholics recognize the deep and fundamental role
conscience plays in moral deliberation.
The rule and measure of duty is not utility, nor expedience, nor the happiness of
the greatest number, nor state convenience, nor fitness, order, and the pulchrum.
Conscience is not a long-sighted selfishness, nor a desire to be consistent with oneself; but it is a messenger from him, who both in nature and in grace, speaks to us
behind a veil and teaches and rules us by his representatives. Conscience is the aboriginal vicar of Christ, a prophet in its informations, a monarch in its peremptoriness,
a priest in its blessings and anathemas, and, even though the eternal priesthood
throughout the church could cease to be, in it the sacerdotal principle would
remain and would have a sway?
This conception of conscience must be resolutely distinguished from the antagonistic
accounts proposed by various philosophers.
We are told that conscience is but a twist in primitive and untutored man; that its
dictates is an imagination; that the very notion of guiltiness, which the dictate
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enforces, is simply irrational, for how can there possibly be freedom of the will, how
can there be consequent responsibility, in that infinite eternal network of cause and
effect, in which we helplessly lie? And what retribution have we to fear, when we
have no real choice of good or evil?8
Equally it must be distinguished from the vulgar conception of conscience often found
in the popular mind.
When men advocate the rights of conscience, they in no sense mean the rights of
the creator, nor the duty to him, in thought and deed of the creature; but the right
of thinking, speaking, writing, and acting, according to their judgment or their
humour, without any thought of Cod at all .... Conscience has rights because it has
duties; but in this age, with a large portion of the public, it is the very right and freedom of conscience to dispense with conscience, to ignore a lawgiver and judge, to
be independent of unseen obligations. It becomes a license to take up any or no
religion, to take up this or that and let it go again, to go to church, to go to chapel,
to boast of being above all religions and to be an impartial critic of each of them.
Conscience is a stern monitor, but in this century it has been superseded by a counterfeit, which the eighteen centuries prior to it never heard of, and could not have
been mistaken for it, if they had. It is the right of self-will."
Finally, despite the fact that one's conscience can be distorted and that the very idea of
conscience can be easily misunderstood in the popular mind, Newman is adamant about
the finality of the deliberations of conscience in the moral life. For Newman we have" a
duty of obeying our conscience at all hazards."'o Even the authority of the pope, who for
Newman is nothing less than the medium of divine revelation, must take second place to
the authority of conscience. "Certainly, if I am obliged to bring religion into after-dinner
toasts, (which indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink, - to the pope, if you
please, - still, to conscience first, and to the pope afterwards.""

IV
We can see in these remarks of Newman some of the themes which caught our eye in
our earlier survey of the options often developed by cognitive minorities in the face of
opposition. More precisely, we can see a place in the development of our moral existence
for intuition, for divine revelation, and for community and tradition. 'I What is so attractive
is the way in which these are held together in a compelling vision of morality. More especially, Newman's remarks open a door for the application of recent developments in epistemology which scarcely got a hearing in Newman's time. Before taking up this latter
topic, I would like to restate in my own terms the crucial components of the moral vision
suggested here by Newman. ') It has four central elements.
I. First, in moral deliberation it is impossible to escape the tracing of our moral deliberations back to basic moral principles, insights, and judgments which form the foundations
of our moral arguments. In moral debate, there simply comes a point where either we see
or do not see the rightness of what is before us, whether that be a principle, a particular
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state of affairs, or a particular moral judgment. There is no further reason or axiom which
is more basic that we can summon in our attempts to persuade an opponent. We either
see, or we do not see. This constitutes the natural resemblance there is between a theory
of conscience and intuitionism. In both what is envisaged is a basic capacity, a fundamental competence, a non-reducible ability to know what is the case morally speaking.
2. In a developed theory of conscience, this capacity is construed in theistic categories.
Conscience is understood as given by an all-good and almighty Creator who has made
human beings in his own image and has thus transmitted to them his own capacity to
know what is good and evil. This immediately provides a deep warrant for taking conscience with the utmost seriousness. Because conscience is given by God, to go against
conscience is to rebel against the voice of God given to us by nature in creation. More
positively, to obey conscience is to fulfill one's destiny as a creature designed to operate in
a certain way by one's Creator.
Given the way that the nature of conscience is embedded in a theistic universe, it is not
at all surprising that the very idea of conscience should become suspect or even be transformed beyond all recognition, once the theistic universe it inhabits is abandoned. Thus we
should expect thorough-going secularists, whether Marxists or Durkheimians or Freudians,
to provide a radically different construal of what theists will identify as conscience. They
will see the deliberations of conscience as merely the outcome of economic, social, and
psychological forces which have no causal relation to truth. Hence they will reject the
deliberations of conscience as radically misguided. Now, to be sure, if we knew that these
secularist positions were metaphysically correct, then this consequence would follow. In
reality, however, these remain at best thoroughly contested proposals; a mature theist will
have her own reasons for rejecting them or for accepting them only in a deeply modified
form. 14 Moreover, as a theist, she will have her own reasons for adopting a theistic conception of the universe. Hence the minimalist, reduced accounts of conscience so popular in
current philosophical and popular circles will be rejected as radically inadequate.
3. In this account of conscience, conscience is construed in thoroughly dynamic terms.
It is not an all-or-nothing capacity. It is a divinely given competence which clearly develops in infancy, through adolescence, and beyond. Conscience can be hurt and healed; it
can be distorted and sharpened; it can be lost and regained; it can be dulled and
renewed. Hence a full description of the growth and inner dynamic of conscience is an
extraordinary achievement. Moreover, any attempt to plot the relation, say, between conscience, intellect, sentiment, guilt, remorse, and the like, will be a major undertaking
requiring exquisite perceptual and conceptual skill.
4. Fourth, it is precisely because conscience is construed as a capacity or as a competence that it can be corrected and healed by divine revelation and rightly influenced, for
good or ill, by tradition and community.
Thus Christian theists will insist that the ultimate norm of good is revealed in the life
and work of Jesus Christ, the etemal Son of God. In him are hidden the full riches of holiness. Through the working of the Holy Spirit, fellowship with Christ in the body of the
church so heals and enriches human agents that eventually they share the very mind of
C hrist and see the world as he does. ls Hence the Christian looks to the saints of the
church as models of enlightenment to be emulated and consulted on moral issues. In
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these circumstances the inner voice of Cod enables one to discern the moral authority of
Christ and his saints; in turn conscience itself is healed and corrected by the Word of Cod
enshrined in the Scriptures and made fully manifest in Christ. In these circumstances,
there can be no playing of conscience off against divine revelation. ' 6 Special revelation in
the Word of Cod confirms, corrects, and deepens the natural revelation given through
the light which enlightens everyone who comes into the world. '7 From the point of view
of our moral experience, such transformation is not a quick and easy matter either for the
individual or for the Christian community. Individuals may need years and the Christian
church may need centuries before the rightness and wrongness of certain moral claims
are recognized. Such moral development is entirely natural on this account of our competence in moral discernment.

V
We are now in a position to tackle the last segment of our project. The reader will
recall that our fundamental concern was ultimately to address queries about warrants
which naturally arise with the appearance of cognitive minorities. In terms of our vision of
conscience the question which arises is this: How do we know that appeal to conscience
provides us with adequate justification or warrant for our moral claims? To this we now
turn.
The point of entry is Newman's claim that conscience is ·'a constituent element of the
mind, as our perception of other ideas may be, as our powers of reasoning may be, as our
sense of order and the beautiful, and other intellectual endowrnents."' BNewman's suggestion is that we should construe conscience as similar to such other intellectual capacities as
perception, memory, deductive and inductive reasoning, and the like. Thus, just as we
have recourse to memory in making judgments about the past, so do we have recourse
to conscience in making judgments about the moral worth of actions. How does this help
us in developing our account of conscience so that it addresses the quest for knowledge?
In recent years epistemologists have been recovering and exploring an approach to
knowledge in general which is especially pertinent to this issue. From the time of
Descartes and Locke, the two great pillars of the Enlightenment experiment in epistemology, the general tendency has been to construe knowledge in terms of true, justified
belief. The most troublesome element in this tradition has been the problem of securing
justification. The favored approach to this matter has been to pursue the quest for justification in internalist categories. Thus a person is justified in holding to a particular proposition, p, if that person has good reason for holding p, and that reason is known to the person as a reason for p. On this analysis justification for a belief is secured by being aware of
good propositional evidence for that belief.
An obvious difficulty which attends this proposal is how to secure the foundations of
one's beliefs. After all, every time one cites a reason for any belief, that reason itself constitutes a further belief, and questions will naturally arise about the status of that belief.
Justification, on this view, becomes a chain of inference and argument which either goes
on forever or which must come to a halt at an appropriate foundation . In moral theory
intuitionism represents an attempt to stop the infinite regress of argument by insisting that
at some point the agent just sees something to be the case. Not surprisingly, philosophers
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have seen such a move as empty theorizing, as a kind of intellectual hand-waving to flag
down questions. Equally, attempts to speak of a moral sense, of a faculty of discernment,
and the like, have been construed as vacuous proposals which verbally fool their proponents into thinking that they are making epistemic progress. In this intellectual environment a theory of conscience will appear thoroughly dubious.
However, in recent years we have become acutely aware that all is far from well with
this kind of internalist account of justification and its attendant account of knowledge.
Thus many have turned of late to explore an alternative, externalist account of knowledge which proceeds in a radically different direction. The crux of the turn is this. Rather
than look for propositional evidence, say, for our basic perceptual or mernory beliefs, we
ask a very different question. We ask if the practice of memory or the practice perception
is a reliable one. If it is, then we can prima faoe take the beliefs which arise from such
practices as knowledge. This conceptual shift utterly transforms the way we think about
knowledge and justification.
It also transforms the way we should weigh the epistemic status of conscience. On the
old internalist model the question we asked was how we could find further propositional
evidence for those beliefs arising from conscience. On this analysis the concept of conscience was useless. On the new externalist model we ask if we have good reason for taking conscience to be reliable. Once we ask that question, the answer is obvious. For the
Christian theist the answer clearly must be yes. Conscience is a God-given capacity; it is a
constituent part of our nature given by a gracious and loving God. Hence, other things
being equal, conscience is a reliable medium of moral knowledge. It is this simple and revolutionary notion which makes manifest the extraordinary epistemic significance of conscience. Prima facie, conscience is to be trusted to yield knowledge because it is a basic
competence given to us by God. 19
A consequence of this analysis is worth noting. On the internalist account of knowledge, one can only know something if one also knows how one knows. Thus I know p, if
and only if I believe p, if p is true, if p is justified, say, by q, if I know q, and if I know that
q justifies p. The obvious problem with this analysis is that it eliminates a host of things
which most normal people would insist they knew. For instance a child can know that it
is raining, or my dog can know that she is about to go for a walk without satisfying such
stringent conditions. On the externalist account one knows p if one has arrived at p
through a reliable process. It is not at all essential that one also know how or why the
process is reliable, although clearly knowing why the process is reliable may enhance
one's epistemic status. It is precisely this feature of our externalist account of conscience
which shows why conscience has been taken so seriously in the Christian tradition. Even
the conscience of the unbeliever, that is, the deliberations of one who may explicitly deny
its divine origin, is to be taken seriously. The reason for this is that one may well know
moral truth even though one may not know how one knows such truth. Just as through
perception I may know immediately that it is snowing, even though I may not have a
clue how to defend the reliability of perception, equally through conscience I may know
immediatedly that it wrong to roast people for fun, even though I may not have a clue
about where my conscience comes from or why it should be normally relied on in my
moral deliberations.
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VI
In conclusion we can now connect this account of conscience to the empowering of
Christian minorities. We noted earlier that the concept of conscience has had a precarious
place in the moral theorizing of the last two centuries. As Newman rightly suggested, both
philosophical a nd popular conceptions of conscience in his day totally failed to convey
the full force of the idea as developed in the Christian tradition. Since then the situation
has not improved; on the contrary, the progressive secularization of Western culture has
made talk of conscience even more precarious than it was in the nineteenth century.
With the increasing secularization of the Church, it is now common to find the idea of
conscience treated as a hostile stranger even within its sacred precincts. As Christendom
collapses, and as mainline churches loosen their intellectual moorings from Scripture and
tradition, then those committed to talk of conscience and to its healing by the grace of
Jesus C hrist w ill become even more of a minority than they have been in the past. The
gap between the working conscience of serious believers and their neighbor is likely to
grow wider and wider.
In these circumstances retrieving the riches of the tradition buried in and around the
idea of conscience is a salutary exercise in at least two ways. First, it will help keep alive
the C hristian tradition in bleak and difficult times. One cannot take conscience seriously
without also taking seriously a whole range of theological themes and convictions which
naturally circle round it. Secondly, it will put heart into Christians as they live and witness
in a hostile environment. At one level a sound grasp of the nature and role of conscience
will give intellectual and spiritual protection from the moral degeneration wh ich is so
clearly visible in the world around us. At another level it will help Christians cultivate a
deep respect for the neighbor. On the reading of the human situation proposed here,
even enemies are to be respected and heard. Even though one's opponents may be radically different in outlook, even though from a Christian perspective they may be corrupt
in their conscie nce, and even though they may be totally opposed to a theistic account of
conscience, they are to be treated as agents made in the image of God who can always
be redeemed and transformed- or as Newman says, they are to be urged to obey their
conscience against all hazards. In the meantime Christians can draw on the full resources
of grace made available in the gospel and in the teachers and members of the church.
Among the latter I am pleased to acknowledge my deep gratitude to Professor Robert
Lyon whose strong and sensitive conscience as a scholar, as a teacher, and as Christian
believer leaves so many of us in his debt.
NOTES
I. I limit my concern here to moral claims. Our question easily can be extended to encompass theological and other claims.
2. This is so much a part of the contemporary mainline academic scene that documentation
would be superfluous. It has become so embedded in some circles that merely to question the new
status quo will be seen in terms of backlash. See for example, Susan Thistlethwaite's "Beyond dualism: Rosemary Radford Ruether's New Women/ New Earth," The Christian Century (April 24,
1993): 339-402.
3. George Marsden's work on the secularization of the academy and on the history of fundamentalism are especially helpful treatments of aspects of this theme. See George M. Marsden,
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Refonning Fundamentalism: A History of Fuller Theological Seminary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987)
and George M. Marsden and Bradley L. Longfield, eds., The Secularization of the Academy (New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1992).
4. Note that I am using "intuition" here as almost a technical term in moral philosophy. I do
not mean by intuition some kind of non-rational hunch. On the contrary, intuition is intended to
signify the kind of rationality appropriate to morality.
5. John He nry Newman, Certain Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching Considered
(London: Pickering, 1976), pp. 246-26 1.
6. Ibid., p. 246.
7. Ibid., pp. 248-249.
8. Ibid., p. 249.
9. Ibid., p. 250.
10. Ibid., p. 259.
I I. Ibid., p. 26 I.
12. I leave aside for the moment any reference to empowerment.
13. Needless to say the account which follows will be much more Protestant in orientation and
content than what one will find in Newman.
14. Some modern Protestant treatments of conscience all too readily succumb to the implications of entirely secular, non-theistic conceptions of human agents at this point. See, for example, C.
Ellis Nelson, Don't Let Conscience Be your GUIde (New York, NY: Paulist Press, 1978),
15. This is beautifully captured in Romans 12: 1-4.
I 6. That we may be tempted to do this, that is, insist on one and only one source of moral
e nlightenment, in this case either conscience or Christ, is part of the legacy of standard
Enlightenment epistemologies, such as we find in Descartes, which posit one final, certain source of
moral inquiry. In a sense there is ultimately only one source for the theist, namely the creative activity of the living God. However, it is an elementary truth of Christian theology that the triune God's
creative activity is not confined to conscience.
17. John 1:9.
18. Newman, Difficulties, p. 248.
19. It is worth noting that Descartes makes exactly the same epistemic suggestion with respect
to ordinary perception. See for example his Meditations on First Philosophy (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett,
1980), p. 94.

